After the guns fall silent: Gaza’s fragile bet on technocrats
There is a hush in Gaza that feels less like peace and more like a held breath.
Walk down any street in Gaza City and you will see the layers of that breath: children playing amid rubble-strewn lots, shopkeepers sweeping sand from doorways that once burst with customers, and women queuing for hours at water points while neighbours trade news in whispers. It is a landscape caught between catastrophe and a complicated hope — the kind that arrives not with banners, but with the quiet dispatch of committees, envoys, and international promises.
The new plan on the table
In recent days, mediators led by Cairo rolled out a plan that reads like a diplomatic experiment: a 15-member Palestinian technocratic committee to govern Gaza during a post-war transition, overseen by an international “Board of Peace” reportedly to be chaired by the United States president. The proposal accompanies the second stage of a ceasefire, declared to have begun on 10 October 2025, that aims to disentangle the immediate security needs from the longer, thornier task of running daily life.
On paper, a technocratic committee promises expertise over politics — engineers to repair water systems, public-health specialists to run hospitals, logisticians to coordinate aid convoys. In theory, technocrats can deliver services when political structures are broken. In practice, the success of such arrangements hinges on legitimacy: who appoints them, who protects them, and who believes in them.
“It is a step,” said one senior local figure
Bassem Naim, a senior leader associated with Hamas in Gaza, described the committee as a “step in the right direction,” according to sources close to the group. He framed the initiative as a means to consolidate the ceasefire, ease the humanitarian emergency, and prepare for reconstruction — while reiterating that Hamas does not seek to run the committee’s day-to-day work and would limit itself to monitoring that governance proceeds without undermining local order.
“We are ready to hand over administration and support the committee’s work,” a Gaza official told me, sitting on a concrete curb beneath a sagging awning. “But that is only part of the picture. The mediators, the guarantors, must give them the power to do the job — and the protection to stay alive while doing it.”
On the ground: a city divided
The map of Gaza has become a map of boundaries not just of land but of authority. Since the ceasefire, a so-called “Yellow Line” has marked a seam through the territory — a dividing line between areas still under Israeli military authority and those where Hamas retains public control. For ordinary Gazans, this has translated into a patchwork of rules, access points, and risks.
“There’s a Yellow Line on paper,” said Laila Haddad, a nurse at a clinic that sits just west of one such boundary. “But for patients there are only grey lines — the checkpoints, the roadblocks, the waits. If a committee can restore an ambulance to a reliable schedule, if it can keep our generators fuelled, people will feel the difference.”
Those practicalities are urgent. Gaza is one of the most densely populated places on Earth — home to more than two million people packed into a narrow swath of Mediterranean coast. UN agencies long warned that civilian infrastructure was fragile long before the latest conflict: much of Gaza’s water is unsafe to drink, electricity is intermittent, and healthcare and sanitation systems ran near collapse even in calmer years. Rebuilding these systems will require money, materials and months — if not years — of work.
Who will watch the watchers?
Internationally, the arrangement’s contours are still being sketched. Washington’s envoy has signalled that the ceasefire has entered a “second stage” focused on the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, demilitarisation measures, and accelerated humanitarian aid and reconstruction. A Bulgarian diplomat and former UN Middle East envoy, Nickolay Mladenov, has been mentioned as the on-the-ground lead for the proposed Board of Peace — a role that would ask him to broker between deeply mistrustful sides and maintain donor confidence.
But the proposal raises questions that reach beyond logistics. Who will fund the reconstruction? Who will ensure that disarmament does not become a pretext for sidelining Palestinian political rights? How will the committee’s technocrats be selected to reflect Gaza’s social fabric — its teachers, shopkeepers, refugee community leaders, and civil-society activists — rather than appearing as outsiders parachuted in by foreign capitals?
“Technocratic governance can fix a roof, but it cannot on its own rewrite a social contract,” cautioned Dr. Miriam Al-Sayegh, a political analyst who has spent two decades studying transitional administrations across the Middle East. “If you take power out of the hands of political actors without creating local avenues for accountability, you risk building institutions that are efficient but unloved — and that lack the social legitimacy to be lasting.”
Voices from the street
Across the Gaza Strip I spoke with smallholders, shopkeepers, and aid workers whose lives will be shaped by these decisions.
-
Ahmed, a fisherman in Khan Younis, worries about security. “They say they will demilitarise,” he said, staring at a sky where migrant birds circled above empty beaches. “But who will stop the next explosion? Who will protect the fishermen when the sea is closed?”
-
Fatima, an entrepreneur who runs a tiny tailoring shop, frames her wish in simpler terms: “Give us a permit to import fabric, give us power for our machines, and we will pay taxes and hire people,” she told me. “We don’t care if the managers have big titles — we care that the lines move and the lights don’t die.”
-
Rami, an aid worker from an international NGO, sounded tired but resolute: “The committees and boards must unblock supply chains. Food, medicine, fuel — without them the ceasefire will be a paperwork peace.”
What the world watches
There is a broader global angle here, one that goes beyond Gaza’s shores: the expanding use of technocratic or externally supervised governance in post-conflict settings. From the Balkans to parts of Africa, international actors have tried to substitute expertise for contested politics. Sometimes that has stabilised devastated communities. Sometimes it has left a residue of dependency and stunted political development.
That history should make donors and mediators cautious. Hard reconstruction dollars will be tempting to spend on visible projects — roads, hospitals, ports. But if the committee is to do more than rebuild concrete, it must foster institutions that can be owned by the people they serve. Otherwise, what is rebuilt can quickly be undone.
So, what comes next?
For Gaza’s residents, the coming weeks will be a test. Will the new committee be empowered with clear mandates, freedom of movement, and protection? Will the Board of Peace harness enough international credibility to mobilise funds while respecting local agency? And perhaps most poignantly: will ordinary people in Gaza and beyond feel that this is a process of liberation or another form of foreign tutelage?
There is a practical urgency to these philosophical questions. Rebuilding Gaza is estimated to require billions and to involve clearing rubble, restoring water networks, reconstructing homes and reviving livelihoods. It demands transparency and accountability — and a willingness by all parties to trade maximalist demands for incremental, tangible gains.
As evening fell and the call to prayer echoed faintly over a city still scarred by recent violence, I asked Laila the nurse whether she believed a technocratic committee could make a difference. She paused, then smiled with a tired clarity.
“If they fix our hospital generators,” she said, “I will not care what color their passports are. I will care if my patients live.”
Questions for the reader
What would you trust more: experts with wrenches and spreadsheets or local leaders with messy politics and deep roots? Can external guarantors shepherd a sovereign people toward stability without erasing their right to self-determination? These are the dilemmas at the heart of Gaza’s fragile moment — and they will test not only the parties on the ground, but the international community that seeks to help.















