Somalia’s Strategic Responses to Potential Ethiopian Military Aggression Over the Illegal MoU

The signing of the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Muse Bihi of Somaliland, a self-declared breakaway region of Somalia, on first January 2024, has sparked alarm across the Horn of Africa. This MOU, though not fully disclosed to the public, grants a 50-year concession of 20 km of land along the Somali coast, specifically in the Awdal region, construed to be setting the stage for annexation, hence posing a significant threat to Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence—terms no nation would ever accept.

Despite efforts by Turkey and other international actors to mediate the growing tensions, the situation remains perilous. Ethiopia attempts to leverage the MOU to pressure Somalia into granting access to the sea. Its use of the MOU as a “stick policy” contrasts with Somalia’s firm stance that no negotiations will occur until the deal is retracted. Somalia’s position, grounded in both domestic and international law, seeks to protect its sovereignty and territorial rights in accordance with global conventions like UNCLOS. The deadlock between Ethiopia and Somalia reflects a geopolitical struggle, and it does not only undermine Somalis territorial integrity but also risks destabilizing the region further.

In this analysis, we will explore how Somalis might respond to any potential Ethiopian attempt to enforce the MOU through military intervention. Given the historical friction between these neighboring countries, Somalia has a long tradition of resilience and tactical resourcefulness that it can draw upon in the face of external aggression.

The Geopolitical and Strategic Importance of Somalia:

Somalia’s importance to the Horn of Africa and the world cannot be overstated. Geopolitically, it sits at a critical intersection between Africa and the Middle East, overseeing the crucial shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden, one of the busiest maritime passages globally. Somalia’s coastline stretches over 3,000 kilometers, making it a strategic gateway for global trade and security operations. The country also holds vast untapped natural resources, including oil and gas reserves, which have attracted the interest of international powers.

Geoeconomically, Somalia is central to regional trade routes and has the potential to be a key economic player in the Horn of Africa, a region with growing investment from global powers such as China, the United States, and the European Union. A conflict in Somalia, especially one involving Ethiopia, could disrupt trade, heighten regional instability, and even cause a ripple effect in global markets, especially in sectors reliant on these trade lanes and resource developments.

Geostrategically, Somalia’s location makes it an invaluable ally for both Western and Eastern powers seeking to maintain influence over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. A peaceful, stable Somalia is a linchpin for regional security, counterterrorism efforts, piracy prevention, and economic growth. However, an escalation of conflict with Ethiopia could not only threaten Somalia’s progress but also spark a broader regional war, destabilizing neighboring countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and potentially inviting foreign interventions.

The Escalation of Conflict: Regional and Global Consequences:

Any escalation of conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia would jeopardize not only the Horn of Africa but also the broader international community. The Horn is already a hotspot for humanitarian crises, with millions affected by famine, drought, and internal displacement. A war between Somalia and Ethiopia would exacerbate these issues, creating a refugee crisis that could spill over into neighboring countries and even Europe. One can scarcely imagine the devastation to be caused by the mass displacement from the 150 million people if the two nations were engulfed in conflict. The sheer scale of human suffering—families torn apart, livelihoods destroyed, and entire communities uprooted—would cast a shadow across borders, creating a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions.

Furthermore, both Somalia and Ethiopia face internal challenges from insurgent groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, FANO, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). A full-scale war between these two nations could give these groups an opportunity to gain territory and influence, further destabilizing the region. The potential for extremist elements to exploit the chaos should be of grave concern to the international community. Somalia, however, has several strategies at its disposal to counter any Ethiopian aggression effectively.

1. Military Deployment and Border Fortification:

Somalia’s immediate response to any Ethiopian military provocation would likely be the deployment of forces to fortify its border. Although Ethiopia’s military is larger, Somalia has been steadily modernizing its army, benefiting from international training programs and the establishment of elite units such as the Gorgor and Danab forces. These specialized units, trained by Turkey and the U.S., have become increasingly adept at counterinsurgency and would be key in defending Somali territory. While the capabilities of the current SNA, in terms of both numbers and training, might be called into question, my argument remains that, with a large civilian support, it would marshal all of its available strength to face Ethiopia.

The transition from ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) to AUSSOM (African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia), set to take over the peacekeeping mission beginning January 1,2025, also plays a key role in Somalia’s readiness. With greater responsibility for national security shifting to the Somali National Army (SNA), this transition strengthens Somalia’s military posture. If utilized effectively, the lifting of the arms embargo by the UN Security Council, under Resolution 2714 (2023), on December 2023, will significantly bolster the SNA, empowering the FGS acquire modern military assets and enhancing its capacity to defend against external threats.

Somalia’s military response would also be supported by legal frameworks. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Somalia has the inherent right to self-defense, while various African and international treaties protect its territorial integrity, including the Charter of the Organization of African Union (OAU)/African Union (AU), the AU Constitutive Act, the Agreement

Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Charter of the Arab League, the Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations 1961, the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969, the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933, the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1958, among others. This legal backing would strengthen Somalia’s position in any diplomatic and military efforts to counter Ethiopian aggression.

2. Civilian Mobilization and Historical Resistance:

Somalia’s history is marked by its civilian mobilization during times of national threat. The Ogaden War of 1977 is a testament to how Somali civilians, united by their warrior culture and decentralized clan structures, have rallied in defense of their country. In a modern conflict, a similar mobilization could be expected, with clans from Federal Member States and beyond coming together in defense of Somali sovereignty. Recently, acknowledging the strategic importance of civilian influence along the border, Ethiopian officials have intensified efforts by organizing meetings with the Somali local administrations and clan elders to secure their cooperation and mitigate any potential resistance or uprisings that could threaten Ethiopian interests in the border areas.

Somalia’s cultural figures, such as poets and singers, have historically played a significant role in galvanizing the population. Combined with calls for Jihad from religious leaders, civilian fighters from every corner of Somalia and its diaspora could take up arms. This mass mobilization, drawing upon Somalia’s deep cultural and historical legacy, would serve as a powerful force against any Ethiopian aggression.
It is no surprise that even those from Somaliland would stand against Ethiopia, particularly the fierce warriors from the Samaroon and Isse tribes from Borama, Zeila, Baki, and Lughaya— strategic zone that Ethiopia might target in its quest for access to the Red Sea. Alarmed by the recent illegal MOU, the residents of these districts remain vigilant, prepared to defend their land against any potential Ethiopian incursion. Djibouti is believed to have tacitly endorsed these actions, a significant factor contributing to the recent decline in its relations with neighboring Somaliland. Similarly, Somali communities from the Northern Frontier District (NFD) would follow suit, and a surge of fighters is expected from that part, further strengthening the resistance against Ethiopia. This civilian movement across the peninsula evokes memories of the 16th century, when Imam Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Ghazi rallied the Somali people in a united Jihad against the Abyssinian kingdom.

3. Leveraging Internal Insurgencies Within Ethiopia:

In addition to direct military engagement, Somalia could capitalize on Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities by supporting ethnic and nationalist insurgencies. One potential strategy could involve reinvigorating the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a group historically advocates for greater autonomy for Somali Region (Ogaden). Although the ONLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in 2018, underlying discontent continues to simmer in the region. By reigniting insurgent activities in the Somali region, Somalia could strategically align these operations with its own military objectives. This could force Ethiopia to divert critical military resources to address internal conflicts, thereby weakening its capacity to engage in external confrontations.

Moreover, Somalia could explore alliances with Ethiopian insurgent groups to counter Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Amhara militia group Fano, reportedly backed by Eritrea, are already contributing to Ethiopia’s domestic upheaval. Supporting these groups could intensify Ethiopia’s civil discord, potentially creating a multi-front insurgency that would increase pressure on Abiy Ahmed’s regime. This could disrupt Ethiopia’s expansionist efforts and force it to reassess its aggressive posture toward Somalia, weakening its ability to project coercive power regionaly. By exploiting Ethiopia’s internal challenges, Somalia could create a strategic quagmire for its adversary and shift the balance of power in its favor.
In light of this, it is crucial to underscore that Somalia’s stance is not to exploit Ethiopia’s internal strife to foment instability. Rather, this can only be seen as stopgap defense mechanism and interim protective tactic focused on safeguarding Somali’s sovereignty and deterring any external threats. Somalia’s strategic vision remains committed to fostering a stable and peaceful Horn of Africa, in stark contrast to the more aggressive ambitions attributed to Abiy’s foreign policies.

4. The Role of Extremist Groups: Exploiting Chaos

Extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia could exploit the instability brought on by a potential Somalia-Ethiopia conflict to expand their operations. Al-Shabaab, with a significant presence in southern Somalia, and ISIS-Somalia, based in the Galgala Mountains of Puntland, might see an opportunity to further their agendas while both Somalia and Ethiopia are preoccupied with military confrontation.

Al-Shabaab, in particular, could frame Ethiopia’s involvement as an act of foreign occupation, stirring a mixed Jihad and nationalist sentiments within Somalia. This narrative could rally local support and invite new recruits. Meanwhile, ISIS-Somalia, though smaller, could pose a serious threat from Puntland’s mountainous terrain, using guerrilla tactics to complicate Ethiopia’s objectives.

These groups may also extend their reach into deep Ethiopia’s Somali Region, as they have done before. In July 2022, Al-Shabaab launched a major assault on the Somali Region in Ethiopia, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the then-ongoing Tigray conflict. Though this attack was repelled through coordinated efforts between local Somali forces and Ethiopian troops, the dynamics of a new conflict could be different. Should a direct confrontation arise, Somalia’s ability to cooperate with Ethiopia in countering these militant threats would likely be compromised, giving extremist groups more freedom to operate across borders.

In such a scenario, both nations could find themselves fighting on multiple fronts, further destabilizing the region and prolonging the conflict. The strategic ambitions of Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, combined with the complexities of cross-border tensions, would present a significant challenge to Ethiopia’s security apparatus as it seeks to maintain stability and prevent these groups from gaining ground.

Eventually, it is in the mutual interest of both nations to prevent Al-Shabaab from gaining new footholds within their respective territories. However, my contention is that any military confrontation between the two would likely create a chaotic environment, making it increasingly difficult to monitor and restrict the group’s movements, as they would undoubtedly exploit the instability to advance their operations.

5. Strengthening International Alliances and Diplomatic Pressure:

Somalia is likely to strengthen its regional and international alliances in response to rising tensions with Ethiopia. One key potential ally is Egypt, which is already involved in its own conflict with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This dispute may drive Egypt to support Somalia as a means of undermining Ethiopia’s influence. Recent signs of this alliance include the arrival of Egyptian arms shipments in Somalia on September 22, 2024, signaling increased military cooperation. As tensions with Ethiopia continue, further diplomatic and military collaboration between Somalia and Egypt is anticipated.

The historical relationship between Somalia and Egypt spans from ancient trade ties during the Pharaonic era, where Egypt sought resources like myrrh and gold from the Land of Punt, to deep cultural and religious bonds in the Islamic period, notably through Cairo’s Al-Azhar University. This relationship evolved through the colonial period with shared Arab-African solidarity, and after Somalia’s independence in 1960, Egypt supported Somali sovereignty and their regional disputes, particularly with Ethiopia. During the Cold War, both nations aligned through Pan-Africanism and the Non-Aligned Movement, while in modern times, collaboration has focused on education, diplomacy, and regional politics, especially concerning Ethiopia’s regional ambitions.

Eritrea, long at odds with Ethiopia, may align with Somalia in response to increasing tensions with Ethiopia’s current administration. Afwerki is believed to support Ethiopian opposition groups, and his deteriorating ties with Abiy open the door for a potential trilateral alliance involving Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea. Such a coalition could serve as a counterweight to Ethiopian military provocations. Recent diplomatic exchanges between the foreign ministers of these three nations further suggest a growing alignment against Ethiopia.
Moreover, due to Eritrea’s geographical proximity, shared ethnic ties and language, and the long-armed confrontations, it possesses unparalleled insight into Ethiopian military nature. This makes Eritrea uniquely positioned to understand Ethiopia’s tactics and strategic approach. As a result, Somalia’s alliance with Eritrea in countering any Ethiopian aggression offers invaluable firsthand intelligence, expert knowledge, and effective strategies, significantly enhancing Somalia’s defensive capabilities. This is why, In the context of replacing Ethiopian troops currently serving under ATMIS, Eritrea and Djibouti are considered the most suitable options for deployment in the Somali border regions currently secured by Ethiopian forces, surpassing any other potential alternatives.

Historically, Somalia and Eritrea have shared both cooperation and conflict. Somalia backed Eritrea’s bid for independence from Ethiopia, fostering early solidarity. However, tensions flared when Eritrea allegedly supported Somali insurgents like Al-Shabaab in the context of its rivalry with Ethiopia. In recent years, especially after Eritrea’s peace deal with Ethiopia in 2018, Somalia and Eritrea have made efforts to rebuild their relationship, with a shared focus on countering insurgents and Ethiopia’s renewed expansionist tendencies in the Horn of Africa.

Additionally, Turkey remains a critical ally for Somalia. A Turkish-Somali defense pact, signed on February 8, 2024, underscores Turkey’s long-term commitment to Somalia’s security. This 10-year agreement includes provisions for defense and economic cooperation, with a strong focus on military support and naval training. A significant aspect of this agreement is Turkey’s role in managing and safeguarding Somalia’s maritime waters, a crucial element in addressing regional threats, including piracy and territorial disputes. The deal aims to boost Somalia’s military capacity, particularly in facing maritime and land-based security challenges. This pact is part of a broader strategy to solidify Somalia’s defense infrastructure and its regional security posture. Turkey’s continued investment in Somalia, from military training to infrastructure development, reflects a deepening strategic partnership that further solidifies Somalia’s ability to respond to regional threats, including those posed by Ethiopia.

Alongside the aforementioned, Somalia can forge alliances with other countries in pursuit of its noble cause of preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Established in 2020, Somalia’s membership in the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, known as the Red Sea Council, offers a strategic opportunity to expand alliances and enhance regional efforts to ensure the security and stability of this crucial maritime zone and the related Indian Ocean. Chaired by Saudi Arabia, the council includes Somalia alongside Eritrea, Sudan, Jordan, Djibouti, Yemen, and Egypt. Somalia could also continue to engage global institutions such as the United Nations, European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Arab League, among others, to isolate Ethiopia diplomatically. International condemnations of Ethiopian aggression, combined with the threat of economic sanctions, could pressure Ethiopia to step back from its aggressive policies.
Ultimately, Through the reinforcement of strategic alliances and meticulous own preparation, Somalia is positioned to counter any potential military aggression from Ethiopia while bolstering its defense capabilities and regional influence. This strategy not only enhances Somalia’s geopolitical stature but also aligns with the historical and strategic interests of its key partners, allowing the country to navigate regional complexities with greater strength and foresight.
Conclusion: The Need for Global Intervention
If Ethiopia continues to pursue its MOU with the Somaliland and escalate tensions with Somalia, it risks igniting a conflict that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. Somalia, drawing on its history of resilience, strategic alliances, and resistance capabilities, would mount a formidable defense.

However, the consequences of such a war would reverberate far beyond the two nations, potentially destabilizing an entire region already grappling with extremism, poverty, and humanitarian crises. It is in the interest of the global community to prevent such a devastating conflict before it is too late. Diplomatic intervention, combined with economic and political pressure, could de-escalate tensions and foster a peaceful resolution. The time for action is now—before the region descends into chaos.

Ahmed Mohamed Afi,
Strategist, and former Senior Political Advisor to the Former President of Somalia. He can be contacted at ahmedafi09@gmail.com