Brussels in the rain: a summit, a promise and a legal tug-of-war
When I arrived in the square outside the European Council, the flags were damp and the mood taut. Umbrellas bobbed like a small, cautious fleet; journalists hustled, aides darted between doors, and a cluster of Ukrainian refugees lingered near a café, watching the procession of black SUVs. At the centre of the day’s agenda was a decision that could reshape the postwar recovery for Ukraine — and the legal landscape of Europe: an EU plan to mobilise some €140 billion in immobilised Russian assets and channel them to Kyiv as a loan.
On paper the number is blunt and beautiful: €140 billion. On the ground, it smells of coffee and damp wool coats, and it tastes like a wager — a loan to be repaid only if and when Russia is forced to pay war reparations. That conditionality is the hinge of the scheme: no repayments unless a future reckoning with Moscow demands them.
Three demands that could stall a continent
But the path to agreement was far from smooth. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever — representing a country that hosts Euroclear, the vault where much of the immobilised assets sit — announced three conditions that he said were make-or-break. In blunt terms, De Wever argued that the legal basis for a mass reallocation of frozen assets is shaky, and that Belgium would not quietly be the first mover without iron-clad guarantees.
“We need solidarity if we’re going to be the ones taking on the risk,” a senior Belgian official told me, echoing De Wever’s view. “If there’s a call to repay, it must be a shared call.”
His three demands were straightforward: legal clarity that protects member states from future claims, mutualisation of the financial risk so every EU country would chip in if repayment is ever required, and synchronized action — that every state holding immobilised Russian assets moves at the same pace. “If these three demands are not met, I will do everything in my power, politically and legally, to stop this decision,” De Wever warned reporters on arrival.
Politics first, technicalities follow
From the other side of the table came a different tune. European Council President António Costa framed the day as one of political resolve. “Today we will take the political decision to ensure Ukraine’s financial needs for 2026 and 2027,” he said, emphasising that the heavy lifting of technical design could be handed to the European Commission afterwards.
There is a rhythm to this: leaders sometimes make a political pact, then let lawyers and financiers worry about the scaffolding. But that rhythm assumes trust between capitals, and trust is in short supply when tens of billions — indeed, hundreds — sit immobilised under complex legal regimes.
What’s actually on the table?
- €140 billion in immobilised Russian assets proposed to be transferred to Ukraine as a conditional loan.
- Repayment to be triggered only after Russia is legally ordered to pay war reparations.
- Belgium — home to Euroclear, the primary custodian — demands legal safeguards, mutualised risk, and coordinated pacing from all asset-holding states.
Voices in the square: onloookers, experts and the Ukrainian welcome
Around the corner from the summit, I met Marta, who runs a tiny borscht stall for exiles and students. “My sister is still in Kharkiv,” she said, stirring a ladle as if she could stir history into order. “We need the money to rebuild hospitals, not to debate it in Brussels forever.” Her voice carried the impatient humility of people who have been waiting for years.
Legal scholars, too, sounded alarms and offered roadmaps. Dr. Elena Popov, a European law specialist based in The Hague, said: “This is unprecedented in modern practice. We do have precedents for frozen assets during conflicts, but converting them into loans tied to reparations crosses into new legal territory. The Commission must craft mechanisms that can withstand litigation on both property and sovereign immunity grounds.”
And then there was President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, present in Brussels and greeted by Costa as “a future member of the European Union.” Zelensky struck a familiar but powerful note: he called the measures “very important” and suggested a ceasefire might be conceivable only with intensified pressure on Moscow, while firmly rejecting the idea of territorial concessions.
Sanctions: the 19th package and the squeeze on Russian energy revenues
Beyond the asset debate, leaders approved the EU’s 19th package of sanctions against Russia — a progressive tightening of the economic vise. The headline: a ban on liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, rolled out in two stages. Short-term contracts will be allowed to run for six months; long-term deals will expire starting 1 January 2027. The move accelerates the bloc’s separation from Russian gas revenue streams, edging the timeline forward from earlier Commission roadmaps.
Other measures add teeth to the strategy: 117 more vessels from Moscow’s “shadow fleet” were listed, bringing the total to 558; banks in Kazakhstan and Belarus were targeted; and, notably, two Chinese refineries — Liaoyang Petrochemical and Shandong Yulong Petrochemical — together accounted for some 600,000 barrels per day and were added to the sanctions list. Those two plants represent roughly 3% of China’s ~19 million bpd refining capacity — not negligible when stacked against the goal of choking off Russia’s war-funding revenue.
The EU also singled out Tianjin Xishanfusheng International Trading Co, accusing it of playing a central role in rerouting EU-origin goods to Russian entities prohibited from receiving them. That move signals a willingness to point a finger not just at Moscow’s direct partners, but at firms and nodes in global supply chains that enable circumvention.
Why this matters to you — and to the world
Ask yourself: what is the price of precedent? If European states convert immobilised assets into a loan, tied to the uncertain prospect of reparations, they will have charted a course for how democracies can use frozen wealth in the service of post-conflict reconstruction. That could be a blueprint for future conflicts — or a Pandora’s box that draws central securities depositories into political crossfire.
And the stakes are human. Rebuilding Ukraine means hospitals, schools, electricity grids and farmland. The World Bank and other institutions have estimated reconstruction costs for Ukraine in the hundreds of billions. Every legal delay or political standoff ripples out to communities on the ground.
Questions the EU must answer
- Who bears the risk if courts or claimants assert ownership of immobilised assets?
- How will the EU ensure parity so no single member state absorbs disproportionate legal exposure?
- Can sanctions and financial reallocations be structured to withstand global trade and legal scrutiny?
After the summit: what to watch
If the political decision is taken, the real work begins. The Commission will need to design instruments that balance urgency with durability: trust funds, guarantees shared across the Union, clear legal immunities, and transparent governance so citizens see where every euro goes. Expect lawsuits from Russian claimants, diplomatic friction with states slow to act, and continued jockeying over the LNG ban timetable.
As I walked back past the wet flags, a young Ukrainian volunteer named Andriy paused to light a cigarette and laughed softly: “We’re used to miracles in small doses,” he said. “But I’d prefer this one to be mostly bureaucracy and money.”
Will the EU take the leap? Or will legal caution and national hesitations keep citizens in Kyiv waiting? The answer will not just shape one reconstruction plan — it may help define how democracies mobilise frozen assets to repair the damage of war in the 21st century. And as you read this, consider where you stand: Do the needs of the living outweigh the legal strings of the past? How much risk should one country shoulder for the collective good?
Brussels may sign on a dotted line. But rebuilding a nation takes more than signatures — it takes solidarity, legal craftsmanship, and an honesty about risk that ordinary people like Marta and Andriy can see in practice, not just in headlines.
