Europe is initiating an extensive spending initiative comparable to the nearly trillion euro response to the Covid pandemic.A great deal of the rhetoric reflects the existential threat that the pandemic posed.
This time, the looming danger comes from Russia.
“There is an intelligence assessment indicating that Russia will test EU defenses within three to five years,” noted a senior EU official.
There are apprehensions regarding Donald Trump potentially withdrawing the US from NATO.
In 2020, the crisis was propelled by the rapid and brutal impact of a deadly virus; this time, it is the unholy alliance between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
The EU’s White Paper on Defence outlines three goals: to support Ukraine during its most challenging period, to transform it into a “steel porcupine” that will make Russia think twice about a re-invasion; to replenish Europe’s dwindling stockpiles to deter any Kremlin intentions toward Eastern Europe; and to prepare for a potential withdrawal of the US from Europe.
“If we invest sufficiently in defense, if we enhance our capabilities, it will also deter aggressors from attacking us. Conversely, if we do not take action, our weakness will invite aggression,” stated Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, in remarks to reporters on Thursday.
Free riding
This represents a crucial turning point.
Having faced relentless criticism (much of it misguided) from Donald Trump that Europe was free riding on post-war US security, a consensus is emerging that Europe is finally reversing decades of declining defense spending and dependence on the United States.
The White Paper promises up to €800 billion in new expenditures over five years; concurrently, an Anglo-French coalition aims to establish a “reassurance force” on the ground in a post-ceasefire Ukraine.
Germany has recently amended its debt ceiling to allow extensive borrowing for defense and infrastructure, while the Financial Times has reported plans from Europe’s key military powers to gradually assume the majority of NATO’s commitments to dissuade President Trump from a unilateral withdrawal.
However, many questions linger.
After briefings with G7 national security advisors on Wednesday, EU officials surprisingly expressed optimism regarding the Trump-Putin phone call and its follow-up interaction with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky.
António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen greet Volodymyr Zelensky at a European Council meeting.
Of particular interest was the proposal to halt attacks on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea, both areas where Europe has heavily invested resources (restoring Ukraine’s maritime access is crucial for Kyiv to regain export markets in Asia).
With the exchange of hundreds of prisoners, it was deemed “a good day for Ukraine,” according to one senior EU figure.
Yet, skepticism remains regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions.
He offered only the slightest of concessions: abstaining from targeting energy infrastructure (just as spring arrives) while demanding Ukraine’s complete surrender. Mobilization of Ukrainian troops is prohibited (though there is nothing to stop Russia), and Russia retains control over regions it has illegally annexed, with no European peacekeepers in Ukraine, even under a NATO banner.
‘Trump holds many cards’
Essentially, President Putin has embarrassed President Trump, who naturally portrayed the phone call in overly favorable terms.
With President Trump ready to employ intimidation to pressure President Zelensky into striking a minerals deal and agreeing to a full ceasefire (which was quickly rejected by Russia), it is hard not to conclude that, in a pinch, President Trump may revert to coercing Ukraine instead of confronting Russia.
“Trump holds many cards,” asserts Rafael Loss, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
“Recent weeks have shown he is willing to use them against Ukraine, but not to compel Russia to waver from its maximalist demands.
“He could increase military assistance or tighten sanctions.
“However, he seems more interested in normalizing relations with Russia. Ukraine appears to be an obstacle to that goal.”
Part of that normalization indicates President Trump’s eagerness for business agreements. The sentiment in Moscow is reciprocal.
Donald Trump is keen to negotiate a ceasefire deal to normalize relations with Russia.
“American companies lost over $300 billion by exiting the Russian market,” declared Kirill Dmitriev, President Putin’s economic envoy, last week.
“Some American companies may return, but we foresee great opportunities in forming joint ventures with Russian firms.”
As a result, Europe has little incentive to reassess its re-armament program in case the situation improves favorably for Ukraine.
The EU aims to fortify areas with significant deficiencies: integrated air defense, precision missiles for deep strikes, satellites, drones and anti-drone systems, artillery ammunition, and so on.
Officials acknowledge that the financial requirements are considerable.
The commission will introduce a so-called SAFE loans program for member states needing assistance (€150 billion over five years) while also relaxing EU fiscal rules to allow capitals to invest more in defense (with a spending cap increased to 1.5% of GDP, which could theoretically amount to up to €650 billion, resulting in a total of €800 billion).
EU leaders—excluding Hungary’s Viktor Orbán—are convinced that if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, it might attack an EU member state within five years.
Russia is operating an irreversible war economy, diverting 9% of its GDP to defense and gaining substantial battlefield experience.
Hybrid attacks
One senior EU insider stated that the scale and variety of hybrid assaults against Europe by Russia’s military and foreign intelligence services—specifically the GRU and SVR—have become astonishing.
These attacks have ranged from sabotaging transportation infrastructure to an assassination plot against Armin Papperger, the head of Germany’s largest weapon manufacturer, Rheinmetall.
“We had already accustomed ourselves to cyberattacks, incursions by fighter jets in the Baltic, energy blackmail, and the weaponization of migrants at the Finnish and Lithuanian borders,” the source recounted during a recent briefing.
“Now we face hybrid attacks on our physical infrastructure, such as undersea data cables.”
Officials indicate that a stark outcome for Ukraine must be communicated to citizens so they can contemplate the compromises that increased defense spending might involve.
Finnish police seized the Eagle S during a criminal investigation into damage to undersea cables.
They are acutely aware that both the €150 billion SAFE loans program and the relaxation of fiscal rules allowing member states to spend more would result in increased long-term debt and that European voters “are not on board yet” when it comes to tax hikes and spending reductions.
Thus, the European Commission believes that discussions should begin now.
However, despite the talk of a cohesive Europe rising to the challenge, familiar divisions surfaced at this week’s summit, driven partly by traditional disputes over finance and also by geographic proximity to Russia.
Greece, France, Spain, and Italy are advocating for Eurobonds—joint EU borrowing—arguing that the options in the White Paper would only add to their debt burden; conversely, the Dutch and Swedes, who would chiefly be responsible for repaying the loans, are staunchly opposed.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez emphasized “security” rather than “defense,” suggesting that security encompasses a wide array of vulnerabilities, including migration and climate change.
Pedro Sánchez stated Spain is more susceptible to Russian cyber attacks.
On March 13, he noted that unlike the Baltic countries, where deterrence is solely about defense, Spain faces different challenges.
“Our threat does not involve Russia deploying troops across the Pyrenees to the Iberian Peninsula,” he stated, but centers around cyberattacks, terrorism, and civil protection.
Some divisions have political roots.
Prime Minister Sánchez has several far-left coalition members who have opposed military assistance for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, and the same is true for Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, who relies on the Russia-friendly Lega party.
Both leaders have expressed concerns over the term ‘ReArm Europe’ used to describe the increase in spending.
The Kallas plan
Kaja Kallas’ attempt to secure €40 billion in immediate military support is illustrative.
President Trump’s abrupt halt of military aid has left Ukraine severely vulnerable, but it is also the uneven nature of European support (Denmark has provided more military assistance than Italy, France, and Spain combined) that has prompted Ms. Kallas to encourage wealthier countries like France and Italy to contribute more, based on the EU’s GNI redistribution key.
The plan, however, failed to garner support.
France perceived it as an ambush from the former Estonian prime minister, whose role as High Representative for Foreign Policy requires fostering consensus before initiating initiatives.
Kaja Kallas is striving to gather funding to assist Ukraine’s defense.
Ultimately, she proposed an initial €5 billion to supply Ukraine with two million rounds of high-caliber ammunition, but even that proposal did not gain traction.
Ireland expressed support for the Kallas plan.
Tánaiste Simon Harris communicated with her from the US last weekend and instructed Irish officials in Brussels to confirm Ireland’s commitment to provide non-lethal assistance, contingent on consensus at the summit.
As the €40 billion target dropped to €20 billion over the weekend, Ireland’s contribution would have been €315 million, according to the redistribution key, accounting for approximately €100 million already approved by the Cabinet in early March.
About €80 million of that will be allocated toward joint procurement partnerships.
Essentially, Ireland plans to invest in Ukraine’s domestic arms industry, modeled on the collaboration developed between Ukraine and Denmark, aligning with other member states to deliver non-lethal support to Ukraine.
A Ukrainian soldier holds a drone aloft during military training in Donetsk Oblast.
Ukraine’s foreign minister Andrii Sybiha informed Mr. Harris at the Munich Security Conference that Kyiv required “non-lethal elements of air-defense systems, such as radar,” as per a briefing note.
Ukraine has also requested jamming equipment, unarmed intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance drones, and armored personnel carriers from Ireland.
Some of this non-lethal support may come from Ukraine’s own defense sector.
The other €20 million of the €100 million allocation would be divided between training de-mining units and enhancing Ukraine’s cybersecurity defenses.
Irish involvement
At the summit on Thursday, Taoiseach Micheál Martin stated that Ireland was “supportive” of the commission’s White Paper proposals, adding that these had only just been released.
But could Ireland benefit from the promise of billions of euros in soft loans to meet our defense requirements, such as protecting undersea cables?
The Defence Forces review in 2020 indicated that the Naval Service lacked anti-submarine, radar, or air-defense capabilities, making the State’s ability to deter Russian maritime intelligence gathering “exceptionally limited.”
The 2022 Commission on the Defence Forces report concluded that to elevate its capabilities to a “Level of Ambition 2,” Ireland would need a minimum of nine modern ships equipped with “enhanced air, surface, and sub-surface search capabilities,” supplemented by a variety of other technologies.
Micheál Martin stated that Ireland supports the EU’s defense spending initiatives.
In the same year, the coalition proposed a defense budget increase of €1.5 billion, the largest increase on record, aiming to reach Level of Ambition 2 by 2028.
Government circles suggest that the required funding is available, despite annual Department of Finance evaluations, allowing progress toward that goal without resorting to EU loans.
More delicately put, would the Government consider accruing more debt to fund defense instead of other public needs? Welcome to the European discussion, with Russia watching intently.
“The Department of Finance always adopts a cautious approach,” commented one government source.
“Suppose public finances faced strain due to Trump, tariffs, and a downturn in exports, with the pharmaceutical sector requiring monitoring?
“Finance would caution against significant increases in defense spending amid more pressing political commitments, such as housing.”
Ireland faces pressure from other EU nations to increase military expenditures.
Indeed, Sinn Féin swiftly criticized the EU defense spending plans and questioned their potential impact on Irish neutrality.
“It’s disheartening that the EU has managed to locate such vast funds for rearmament while neglecting community funding and a fair transition to combat climate change,” stated MEP Lynn Boylan.
EU officials maintain that member states will be the end users of the loans scheme, which they can access if they choose.
A principal aim is for member states with high defense expenditures to combine their procurement efforts to demonstrate to Europe’s defense sector that substantial orders will be guaranteed, enabling manufacturers to produce more efficiently and at lower costs without the usual fragmentation and interoperability issues.
The Government remains skeptical that even this approach will be immediately beneficial for Ireland.
Levels of ambition
The gaps in maritime and air capabilities, such as sonar and primary radar, are outlined in the Level of Ambition 2 plans, and considering the delivery timelines, limited options exist for collaboration with other member states.
“[Sonar and primary radar] may be the maximum we can manage in the short term,” remarked the source, “largely due to the delays.
“You won’t be purchasing equipment that is merely stored on shelves. There is no indication that any particular capabilities currently exist that could benefit from [joint procurement].
“However, it’s not to say that as we delve further into the program, such opportunities won’t arise.”
Ireland may not be able to collaborate with other EU member states to procure radar and sonar systems.
Ireland has already been increasing its participation in PESCO, the EU-supported initiative encouraging member states to unite to develop new military assets where feasible.
According to official statistics, in 2021, Ireland was merely an observer in one PESCO project and participated in another.
By mid-2023, Ireland had engaged in four projects and observed another 19, many of which involve developing undersea security resources.
Still, Ireland risks the perception of free-riding on European defense, often expressed through op-eds and think-tanks, even as the Government points to significant growth in defense spending.
“There has been some growth [in spending] in recent years,” remarked Fenella McGerty, a senior fellow for defense economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
“However, it remains relatively low. Given the sentiments across the EU, I suspect there will be increased pressure.
“There’s generally pressure on NATO members [to boost spending], but now as the focus shifts to the EU, we might witness a closer examination of what Ireland can contribute regarding undersea security, and the cybersecurity issue with Ireland being a significant technology hub in Europe.”
Vulnerabilities
While recent Russian activities in Irish Atlantic waters and Ireland’s status as a tech hub have raised awareness of these new vulnerabilities, some experts warn of a deeper, more insidious Russian threat aimed at undermining European unity through extensive disinformation campaigns and bolstering far-right, pro-Russia factions.
As Prime Minister Sánchez suggested when dismissing the notion of Russian troops invading the Pyrenees, perceptions of the threat vary based on geographic proximity to Russia.
Nonetheless, in light of President Trump’s potential disregard for Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense clause, even a minor attack by Russia on, for example, one of the Baltic States could pose a serious risk, according to Nicu Popescu, senior policy fellow with the ECFR.
He imagines a scenario wherein Russia remains entrenched in substantial parts of southern and eastern Ukraine by 2030, including access to resources such as personnel, grain reserves, nuclear plants, and military production capacities.
If Russia were to carry out a probing strike against a Baltic State, and Article 5 had lapsed, Europe would have to rely on its mutual support clause (Article 4.27).
About three-quarters of all subsea cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near Irish waters.
“The hypothetical launch of any provocation by Russia against Europe demands a critical EU response,” he wrote in a recent paper.
“Any hint of hesitation or failure to react decisively with complete unity to protect every inch of EU territory would have catastrophic repercussions far beyond the immediate military circumstances.
“The political fallout could unravel the entire European project.”
He further added, “This scenario presents a threat to all EU members, but especially countries like Ireland, Portugal, or Spain.
“These nations may be geographically distanced from direct Russian military threats, yet could still find themselves vulnerable if the EU appears divided.
“The disintegration of the EU as a political entity would leave smaller and medium-sized nations on the continent at the mercy of global powers, fundamentally reshaping Europe’s geopolitical landscape.”
Is that far-fetched?
Four years ago, few anticipated that Russia would mobilize 150,000 troops on its border with Ukraine and then initiate an unprovoked and full-scale assault.
Nor did they foresee Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House, threatening Greenland.
