In Quedlinburg’s central square, both tourists and locals huddle beneath the feeble winter sun, seeking out the scarce rays of warmth at the outdoor lunch tables.
The town boasts a rich historical heritage, as evidenced by its UNESCO-approved half-timbered homes from the 10th and 11th centuries. In 919, King Henry the Fowler was crowned here by Franconian nobles, bestowing upon this trading hub the distinguished title of Cradle of the German Reich.
A short distance from the Quedlinburg castle lies a former prison, now serving as a food bank run by AWO, a nonprofit organization that plays a significant role in the local community.
In total, there are nine distribution centers. AWO supplies food, clothing, or vouchers to about 2,000 families in a town of 24,000 residents, sourcing provisions from bakeries, butchers, supermarkets, and returns from Amazon, all coordinated by a dedicated group of donors, partners, supporters, and volunteers.
The existence of a robust food bank sector in a seemingly prosperous town in Germany — the largest and most affluent country in Europe — somewhat explains the growing support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the former East Germany.
“People feel unheard and perceive politics as distant,” remarks Scherrit. “There’s also the issue of irregular migration. The AfD claims to represent those who feel neglected by the system, unable to make ends meet. It’s easy for the AfD to manipulate these sentiments.”
Anka Schleritt notes that there is a prevailing sentiment that politics feels very remote.
Located near the Harz mountains in Saxony-Anhalt, Quedlinburg exemplifies the de-industrialized landscape of the former East Germany.
The current challenges arise from Germany’s stagnant economy, now in its second year of recession, significantly worsened by the war in Ukraine.
The loss of affordable Russian gas has severely impacted energy-intensive industries. Although inflation has decreased across Europe from the pandemic highs, it continues to strain the pockets of Quedlinburg’s residents.
Quedlinburg represents the challenges faced by de-industrialized former East Germany.
“The financial situation is no longer adequate. Rising costs persist,” asserts Schleritt. “In the near future, fewer young people will be able to sustain a living here, which reduces tax revenue. Many are on minimum wage, resulting in households that depend on food banks and shop at discount stores.”
There is a lingering sentiment that even 35 years after reunification, the former GDR feels marginalized and resentful towards the West, a sentiment that seems to have benefited the AfD.
This attitude suggests that established parties – the Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU) – have neglected the concerns of ordinary voters in struggling regions of the old East.
Otto Uwe Ziegler, the AfD MP for nearby Sangerhausen, anticipates the party will secure over 35% of the vote.
I encounter him at a small AfD rally in the town square. At one end, a vociferous counter-demonstration by a mix of left-wing and evangelical groups drowns out the rhetoric from both sides, exchanging insults across a cobbled no-man’s land, cordoned off by riot police.
“Industrially and in terms of unemployment, the situation is dire. People are fed up with the economic conditions,” says Ziegler.
Otto Uwe Ziegler predicts the AfD will achieve more than 35% of the vote.
“The established parties tell us we lack skilled labor; that’s their narrative. Yet, statistics show many unemployed individuals and very few job openings.”
“What we truly miss are good jobs, traineeships, and especially adult training programs for retraining, enabling individuals to re-enter the workforce. That’s what we need, and it’s what the traditional parties have failed to provide.”
Anke Schleritt recalls her coming of age at the fall of the Berlin Wall. Her father was a mechanic, and her mother a nurse; within the constraints of the Communist system, they at least enjoyed a home and stable income.
Saxony-Anhalt once excelled in engineering, seed production, and textiles under the GDR regime, leading to a wave of startups providing parts for major German automakers, like Audi, Volkswagen, and BMW, after reunification.
Textile workers leveraged their skills with plastics to adapt. “Initially, we felt free and were able to connect and collaborate on a global scale,” Schleritt remembers.
However, as major automotive manufacturers revised their pricing strategies for locally produced components, and with the EU incorporating new Eastern European nations adept at producing parts more affordably, the industry began to falter. A plan to export plant seeds to Africa also failed.
Industries started disappearing.
Today, the Quedlinburg hinterland is home to individuals struggling to make ends meet with multiple low-paying jobs, as inflation erodes disposable income.
“We couldn’t uphold the economy, leading to widespread indebtedness,” reflects Schleritt. “Today, people still feel let down. There’s a pervasive sense of moral decline. Many people perceive that nothing is changing for them, yet they struggle to articulate their desires.”
“It’s this unvoiced anger that the AfD capitalizes on.”
Opponents sharply criticize the AfD for its ability to tap into these deep-rooted grievances.
The party’s co-leader, Alice Weidel, has pledged significant tax reductions and substantial increases in public spending, even suggesting Germany consider leaving both the European Union and the single currency.
“The AfD attracts a deeply ideological voter base that isn’t too concerned with the intricacies of economic policy,” observes Peter Matuschek from the Forsa Polling Institute.
“Instead, these voters align themselves with the AfD as an outsider and an anti-establishment force. Anything that bolsters this image is welcomed. The AfD’s economic policy has numerous flaws, but many of its supporters don’t seem to mind.”
Matuschek estimates that about 10-12% of German voters hold extreme right-wing views, suggesting that the current polling estimate of 21% for the party reflects a departure from established center-right and left parties.
It’s uncertain if these voters will remain with the party after the election. However, the AfD’s entry into the Bundestag in 2017 drastically altered the traditionally restrained political atmosphere, making debates more contentious.
In January, following the fatal stabbing of a toddler and an adult in Aschaffenburg, Bavaria, by an Afghan asylum seeker with mental health issues, Friedrich Merz, the CDU leader, introduced a bill to close Germany’s borders to irregular migration and cease family reunification, seeking the backing of the AfD.
AfD co-leader Alice Weidel has proposed significant tax cuts and increases in public expenditure.
The Bundestag erupted in outrage, signaling the collapse of the protective barrier traditional parties had placed against the far-right. However, this maneuver incited even greater national disapproval, particularly in the West. In Munich, 250,000 demonstrators gathered to express their indignation at Merz’s perceived compromise. Even the typically reserved former Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly condemned it as “wrong.”
“The radical right has become significantly more vocal,” notes Matuschek, “but the question remains whether traditional parties will become increasingly influenced by this polarization, as we witnessed recently, even as the majority of Germans yearn for greater consensus within established frameworks.”
Critics argue that Weidel has made no substantial efforts to moderate the party, in contrast to Marine Le Pen’s endeavor to soften her far-right National Rally’s image in France.
The AfD often takes a pro-Russia stance, although Weidel has stated in debates that Germany should maintain “neutrality” regarding the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.
When AfD MP Bjorn Höcke was prosecuted for using a prohibited Nazi slogan, Weidel initially called for his expulsion from the party but has since appeared content with his continued membership.
The AfD discusses “re-migration,” which critics claim suggests mass deportation of foreigners.
In Sangerhausen, Otto Uwe Ziegler, the AfD candidate, refutes claims of racism within the party.
“Personally, I’ve spent over 30 years in retail, selling textiles, and I have numerous friends from foreign nations. When they hear I’m accused of being a racist, they laugh and dismiss it as nonsense.”
“I don’t know of any racists in our ranks. Our one challenge is with individuals who claim asylum or refugee status. They live here but make little effort to work and integrate into German society.”
Professor Hajo Funke from the Otto-Suhr Political Science Institute strongly disputes this viewpoint.
“Strategically, they are overtly right-wing, extremist, and racist in their ideology. They are serious about it. They’re against migrants. Should they come to power, millions would be expelled. It embodies a form of racism, especially targeted at migrants, but it’s also rooted in disappointment and even anger directed at the current democratic parties.”
The party has advocated for Germany to move past its feelings of guilt over the Holocaust, with a party member denouncing the Holocaust Memorial in central Berlin.
“The AfD is eager to revisit this chapter of our history,” asserts Professor Funke, “notably the faction led by Bjorn Höcke and those aligned with Alice Weidel. They are certainly libertarian economically, but far from liberal. This is evident in their election campaign, which features hateful rhetoric towards migrants and so-called illegal migrants, including Syrians, Afghans, and others. Such viewpoints violate international law and German asylum laws.”
Critics argue that the AfD has shifted the political landscape to the right, prompting the CDU to adopt more aggressive rhetoric on migration issues.
Friedrich Merz, expected to become Chancellor, has challenged Angela Merkel’s centrist shift, particularly regarding migration.
Counter-protesters express their dissent against a march of extreme right supporters in Berlin this morning.
A 69-year-old corporate lawyer and multi-millionaire financier, Merz is campaigning on a pledge to repair Germany’s “broken” economic model. For two decades, Europe’s economic powerhouse thrived, centrally positioned within beneficial supply chains, benefitting from inexpensive Russian gas and a flourishing Chinese market for German automotive exports.
In the last decade, however, Germany has had to accommodate around a million migrants fleeing the Syrian civil war, navigate a pandemic, cope with the cessation of Russian gas, and contend with a contracting Chinese market.
Adding to these challenges are an aging population, decaying infrastructure, and potential devastating U.S. tariffs on its automotive industry, making this Sunday’s election one of the most significant in recent history.
Merz has vowed to cut bureaucracy, reduce net-zero regulations, enhance R&D funding, and minimize welfare benefits. “A strong economy is fundamental for all aspects — for effective social policies and environmental considerations,” he stated during his campaign launch in November.
“Without a robust economy, nothing functions … We aim to set Germany back on a path of growth.”
Germany’s economic troubles are overshadowed by the constraints of the debt brake.
Following the pandemic, the outgoing SPD-Green-Liberal coalition attempted to utilize €60 billion in unspent Covid relief funds but was overruled by the Constitutional Court, which deemed it a violation of Germany’s long-standing debt brake.
A national and EU-wide consensus has emerged that if Europe is to meet escalating defense spending demands in light of the Russian threat, then Germany — and by extension, Europe — will need to borrow more, rendering the debt brake an impractical obstacle to necessary economic action.
Merz has hinted at openness to this idea, favoring growth-driven domestic solutions.
However, the German heartland he represents — the Mittelstand of SMEs within small industries that have historically supported the export boom — faces critical challenges from soaring energy prices and diminished exports to China.
“There has been demonstrable support among Germans for the debt brake,” remarks Peter Matuschek from Forsa.
“This sentiment aligns with the German principle of not spending beyond our means. Nonetheless, opinions have shifted considerably in the last six months. There is now a majority in favor of — not abolishing the debt brake — but modifying it to allow for increased investment.”
Friedrich Merz is anticipated to secure 30%, placing him in a position to lead a coalition, likely with the SPD or possibly even the Greens.
However, Die Linke (the Left) has recently seen a surge in support, suggesting it will surpass the threshold for Bundestag entry.
This development could fragment the next parliament and complicate Merz’s legislative agenda, as altering the debt brake necessitates a two-thirds majority.
The dramatic election has been further impacted by the notable disintegration of the Western alliance and President Donald Trump’s alignment with Russian war objectives.
The AfD’s ongoing rapport with the Trump administration — and its chief ideologue, Elon Musk — elevates the stakes of tomorrow’s election to unprecedented heights.
