As the haze lifted from President Trump’s tariff-driven global economic upheaval, one obvious target came into focus – China.
It is the world’s second-largest economy, America’s primary trading partner, and the nation Mr. Trump has long accused of engaging in unfair trade practices.
World leaders were “kissing his ass,” eager to strike a deal, Mr. Trump remarked at the National Republican Congressional Committee President’s Dinner, just hours before the tariffs took effect.
One figure certainly not eager was China’s President, Xi Jinping.
Annoyed by China’s audacity, Mr. Trump raised tariffs even further – to an astonishing 145% – while everyone else enjoyed a 90-day reprieve.
To escalate matters, Mr. Xi retaliated with 125% duties on US imports. The gloves had truly come off, although Team Trump seemed to be hinting at a willingness to negotiate with Beijing.
“Pick up the phone, come to the table,” urged the White House’s top trade adviser, Peter Navarro, to Mr. Xi during an appearance on Fox News.
But the phone call never came.
Donald Trump has lamented China’s trade practices.
“At some point, hopefully soon, China will understand that the days of taking advantage of the USA, and other countries, are no longer sustainable or acceptable,” President Trump expressed on his social media platform, Truth Social.
But will it?
Some analysts argue that Trumpism is unlikely to bring about change in China.
Why? Because the inverse has already occurred.
“Instead of China becoming more like the United States, the United States is behaving increasingly like China,” wrote Michael Froman, former US trade representative and now President of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, in Foreign Affairs.
“Washington may have established the open, liberal rules-based order, but China has carved out its next phase: protectionism, subsidization, limitations on foreign investment, and industrial policy,” he noted.
For many years, the prevailing belief in Washington – and indeed in Brussels – was that integrating China into the global trading community would promote economic liberalization.
The argument was that a prosperous Chinese populace would demand – and ultimately be granted – political freedoms.
As we now know, this did not come to pass.
Instead, China’s growing wealth was met with a tightening authoritarian grip on centralized power, the pursuit of state-driven economic policies, mobilization of nationalistic sentiments, and a harsh crackdown on dissent.
Read more: US stocks plummet amid escalating trade war with China. China retaliates with tariffs on US goods following Trump’s new levies.
Any perceived challenge to Communist Party authority was swiftly dealt with.
Protesters in Hong Kong, human rights advocates, Uyghurs, journalists, campus Marxists, feminists, religious leaders, and even senior Communist Party officials insufficiently loyal to Xi Jinping found themselves targeted.
Yet, foreign investment continued to flow in.
Mr. Trump was not the only world leader complaining about China’s trade practices.
From the moment China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, other members have voiced concerns over China’s state subsidies, low labor costs, alleged currency manipulation, and forced technology transfers as prerequisites for market access, which have disadvantaged other nations’ industries.
China has dismissed these allegations as unfair, citing its substantial stimulus measures that are often credited with rescuing the global economy following the 2008 financial crisis.
Nonetheless, undercurrents of resentment persist in some circles, feeling that China has entered the game and tilted it decisively in its own favor.
As recently as January, the European Commission filed a complaint with the WTO, alleging “unfair and illegal” trade practices related to intellectual property rights.
For years prior to that, Europe and China frequently clashed over what the EU perceived as an influx of cheaper Chinese goods undermining its local industries, particularly in areas like footwear, toys, and more recently, electric vehicles.
Even back when Donald Trump was primarily known for reality TV, previous White House occupants had criticized China for reshaping global trade to its advantage.
The Obama administration initiated multiple WTO challenges, deeming China’s system “not transparent, predictable, or fair.”
By the time Donald Trump assumed the presidency in 2016 and launched his initial wave of tariffs against China, many American companies operating in the country welcomed his attempts to finally rectify the situation.
As a reporter stationed in Beijing at the time, I recall discussions with business executives frustrated by being compelled into joint ventures and intellectual property agreements with Chinese firms while competing against state-backed domestic enterprises.
They hoped that Mr. Trump’s robust tariffs and tough rhetoric would usher in the long-awaited change.
That did not occur – partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, and halted international trade. But also because China had been preparing for global economic disruptions from actions like those Mr. Trump might impose for quite some time.
“Beijing, and specifically Xi Jinping, likely feels very validated in their decisions over the past decade or so,” stated Jacob Gunter, lead analyst at MERICS, a Berlin-based think tank.
Mr. Xi was the original “de-coupler,” he informed RTÉ News, and aggressively adopted a policy of “self-reliance” to lessen dependence on the US in every aspect.
“They articulate this by saying that China will enter into a protracted struggle with the United States and its allies,” he said, “and now we’re in the process of determining whether that preparation has been sufficient.”
In recent years, China has successfully diversified its export markets away from the United States, strengthening trade ties with countries across Europe and developing economies in the global south.
Since the beginning of the Trump administration, Chinese exports to the US fell from approximately 20% to under 13% of total exports.
In pursuit of self-sufficiency, Beijing has also encouraged domestic consumption, though with limited success (Chinese consumers are typically savers rather than spenders).
In 2015, Beijing declared a significant state-funded industrial policy aimed at attaining global leadership in key manufacturing and technological sectors such as artificial intelligence, robotics, green energy, high-speed rail, and pharmaceuticals.
China’s AI chatbot DeepSeek has been recognized as superior to US models.
This “Made in China 2025” initiative produced tangible results, experts concluded, along with a few shocks.
When China’s AI chatbot DeepSeek was unveiled earlier this year, considered a cheaper and potentially more effective alternative to US models, it elicited a collective gasp from Silicon Valley and anxiety among investors.
It was seen as a game-changer by many in the tech industry.
American consumers began shifting their purchasing habits to favor Chinese low-cost e-commerce giants like Shein and Temu, while also embracing recent innovations from China such as TikTok.
President Xi is unlikely to face a potential uprising from his citizens over the ban on American social media, unlike Mr. Trump who contends with TikTok, as US platforms like Meta and X were never permitted to operate in China in the first place.
Beyond its borders, the “Made in China 2025” industrial policy clearly advanced China’s quest to dominate key sectors.
China now accounts for about 60% of the world’s electric vehicles, half of global shipping, 80% of commercial drones, nearly 90% of solar panels, and between 70% and 90% of lithium batteries. It’s projected that China will surpass the US and Europe in next-generation nuclear energy production within the next decade.
However, it also compelled US leaders to adopt policies reminiscent of a Chinese Politburo meeting.
The trade war during Trump’s first term, for instance, demonstrated how a previously free trade-loving Republican Party had shifted towards protectionism.
His successor, Joe Biden’s significant investments in America’s clean energy and semiconductor sectors under the Inflation Reduction and CHIPS and Science acts, sought to minimize US reliance on Chinese imports while stimulating domestic manufacturing.
Both administrations have worked to restrict China’s access to advanced computing chips to hinder its military and technological advancement.
After years of the deterioration of America’s industrial heartland due to Chinese competition, Mr. Trump maintains that tariffs will prompt American companies to return.
Donald Trump stated he will revive business in America’s industrial heartland.
“We borrow money from Chinese peasants to buy the goods that those Chinese peasants produce,” his Vice President, JD Vance, shared on Fox News recently, warning that this dynamic is about to shift.
Chinese internet users humorously called out the idea of low-cost manufacturing returning to America by creating AI-generated memes depicting overworked and plump laborers slumped over sewing machines and assembly lines in sweatshop-like conditions.
But is Mr. Trump’s aggressive posturing genuinely aimed at restructuring global trade?
If the US administration is committed to bringing American businesses back home and decoupling from China, then tariffs are unlikely to be lifted.
Mr. Xi’s refusal to respond to Mr. Trump’s calls could signify that he understands this reality.
However, Mr. Trump is also aware that China’s sluggish economic growth continues to depend significantly on American consumerism – and that China’s overcapacity issue will compel it to seek out alternative markets.
“China is likely to face multiple challenges,” noted Yanmei Xie, an independent geopolitics analyst.
She pointed out that China enjoys a trade surplus with 150 countries, which may impose their own restrictions to prevent becoming dumping grounds for Chinese exports displaced by US tariffs.
“A tariff-induced slowdown in global growth will further diminish demand for Chinese exports,” she explained.
Conversely, if President Trump is employing tariffs as a negotiation tactic in hopes of reaching a comprehensive agreement with Beijing, President Xi might assess that his American counterpart is not focused on rejuvenating American industry after all and that, unlike him, a democratically-elected leader navigating rising costs and political pressures will be compelled to yield first.
Certainly, the White House’s decision to exempt smartphone and computer imports from punitive tariffs is likely to be viewed in Beijing as a sign of American indecision.
In any case, Mr. Xi appears determined to outmaneuver Mr. Trump in this strategic competition.
Perhaps that’s because he understands that China has already rewritten the rules of engagement.
Where Washington once sought to shape China’s rise through integration into the global economic order, Beijing has methodically cultivated alternative networks of trade, technology, and influence. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road, China is forging new supply chains and deepening its ties across Eurasia, Africa, and beyond. Its state-led model, unconstrained by electoral cycles or public opinion, allows for a long-term consistency in strategy that democratic rivals sometimes lack.
Moreover, by investing heavily in indigenous innovation and promoting domestic champions in critical sectors like artificial intelligence and 5G, China signals its determination to move beyond mere catch-up. The government’s willingness to endure short-term economic pain—whether from tariffs, slower growth, or decoupling—reflects a broader confidence that the balance of power is gradually tilting eastward.
For Mr. Xi, the contest with the United States is not just about trade deficits or market access; it is about establishing China as a peer competitor in shaping the 21st-century world order. In this context, tactical compromises or delays may be simply a means to a larger, more enduring victory. The real question is whether Washington recognizes the scale of this challenge—and whether it can muster the unity and vision needed to respond.
