Europe’s primary concern has been the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House, where he could forge close ties with Vladimir Putin and betray Ukraine.
The indicators were apparent. Mr. Trump expressed clear admiration for the Russian president, even choosing to trust him over US intelligence agencies during the Helsinki summit in 2018.
His supporters claimed that Ukraine was merely a burden on US resources. Trump boasted he could conclude the war in a day, a statement that hinted at a swift agreement favorable to the Kremlin, sidelining both Ukraine and Europe.
On Wednesday night, those apprehensions appeared to come true.
US and Russian delegations were set to commence negotiations immediately; Mr. Trump reached out to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky only after his conversation with Mr. Putin.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with Donald Trump before he was elected US president last September (file pic)
Simultaneously, during the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Mr. Trump’s Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that Ukraine would not be granted NATO membership and could not expect to retain Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014.
Immediate alarm bells rang across Europe.
In Paris, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, and the UK, along with Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, insisted that both Ukraine and Europe must be included in any negotiations, demanding “strong security guarantees” for Kyiv.
The following day at a NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels, Kallas denounced the concessions regarding NATO and Crimea, cautioning, “Any quick fix is a dirty deal.”
Within 48 hours, the West’s unified stance against Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine had been completely altered. Mr. Putin, generally viewed as a war criminal in many European capitals, received a warm reception from the US president, who appeared to have granted him significant concessions before discussions even began.
Nonetheless, conflicting signals emerged.
Pete Hegseth spoke of a “prosperous” and “sovereign” Ukraine, while Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant was in Kyiv discussing a “security shield” in exchange for approximately $500 billion worth of Ukrainian minerals and rare earths.
On Thursday night, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized [the United States’] commitment to Ukraine’s independence during a call with his Ukrainian counterpart, as reported by the State Department.
However, Trumpist demands for Europe to step up its contributions reached a boiling point.
At the NATO meeting, Hegseth acknowledged that the Russian “war machine” was intent on acquiring more Ukrainian territory, yet asserted, “standing up against that is an important European responsibility.”
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth
Europe has been preparing for Mr. Trump’s potential return to the White House for over a year, engaging in intense discussions about how the EU might fill the void—militarily, economically, and diplomatically—if the US disengaged from NATO or made overtures to Vladimir Putin.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, member states have consistently increased their defense budgets to replenish weapons supplied to Ukraine and enhance their own defenses.
The EU has moved closer to NATO; while the alliance’s primary role is defense planning and identifying capability gaps—such as air defenses, munitions, and drones—the EU has focused on financing these capabilities and developing an industrial strategy to produce weapons more economically and efficiently.
A European Commission White Paper is set to address a range of issues, including a defense industrial strategy, the interoperability of weapon systems, and funding mechanisms.
Europe has also countered the Trump narrative asserting that the US has contributed more to Ukraine than the EU.
Since February 2022, EU member states have provided close to €100 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian assistance, compared to €80.5 billion from the United States (Europe has also allocated €20 billion for refugee support).
After Russia’s military success in Ukraine, hopes emerged that Donald Trump might adopt a more assertive stance towards Mr. Putin. A rapid Russian victory—potentially following a withdrawal of US support—would assign Mr. Trump a legacy akin to the problematic one Joe Biden faced following the chaotic exit from Afghanistan.
Scenes from Kabul airport during the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021
Despite Russian advancements on the battlefield in 2024, there are signs that ongoing Western sanctions are beginning to impact Russia. The Russian economy is grappling with soaring inflation and interest rates, a depreciating ruble, and significant labor shortages.
According to the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), this presents an opportune moment for Mr. Trump to apply additional pressure on Mr. Putin.
“Allies must confront Moscow with the possibility of severe consequences if it persists in its aggressive actions,” CEPA remarked in a report ahead of the upcoming Munich Security Conference.
“Now is the time for allies to leverage Russia’s vulnerabilities and apply maximum pressure through steadfast military support for Ukraine, economic sanctions on Russia, and diplomatic efforts.”
“Any alternative endangers a prolonged conflict reminiscent of Afghanistan, which would exact a far greater toll in blood and resources on the United States and its allies.”
‘An easy way and a hard way’
There are indications that Mr. Trump may be contemplating such strategies.
On January 23, he cautioned Mr. Putin that there was “an easy way and a hard way,” threatening to impose additional sanctions if he did not engage in talks to resolve the war. Mr. Trump has also maintained existing sanctions.
Meanwhile, EU diplomats are working behind the scenes to adjust to a US administration that no longer appears to be a reliable ally and has undermined established diplomatic norms.
High-ranking officials have stated that Europe’s approach—regarding both Ukraine and trade tariffs—has focused on unity, avoiding reactions to every provocative statement from the White House.
Officials acknowledge that the EU’s established connections within the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the White House have been disrupted. Reaching the appropriate individuals to assert Europe’s position has become challenging.
One EU diplomat warns against overreacting to Mr. Trump’s seeming reckless decisions.
“That fundamentally misreads the way Trump operates,” the diplomat asserts.
“To assume that Trump would consult the EU before taking such actions is utterly naïve. While this situation is undeniably problematic, it aligns with the expectations of his operational style. We must ensure that when conversations occur, we are prepared to participate.”
The dynamics of bringing Europe to the negotiating table remain under consideration as Mr. Trump accelerates processes.
Diplomats suggest that Europe needs to establish connections between trade and security policies and demonstrate confidence when engaging with the US president to ensure its voice is recognized.
Europe must also remind Mr. Trump—perhaps employing flattery—that if he wishes to leave a legacy as a peacemaker and dealmaker, he cannot force Ukraine into capitulating under Russian terms.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal before the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President JD Vance cautioned that Washington possesses the economic and military leverage necessary to push Mr. Putin towards negotiations (his spokesman later refuted that the US was issuing any military threats).
US Vice President JD Vance speaking in Munich yesterday
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant also mentioned the possibility of imposing further sanctions.
He stated on Fox News: “If we believe that racheting the sanctions regime up to a maximum threshold will give us negotiating leverage—and as you know, no one understands negotiating leverage better than President Trump—then that will be his call, and Treasury will implement it.”
Of course, there is also the implicit leverage against Ukraine; Washington might withhold military support if President Zelensky does not agree to a deal.
This would undoubtedly trigger a significant crisis within NATO but would certainly sharpen the focus on the incentives for both President Zelensky and Mr. Putin to reach an agreement now that negotiations seem to be on the horizon, as well as how current battlefield dynamics will influence those talks.
Russia currently occupies one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory, comprising Crimea and parts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, and Zaporizhzhya Oblasts.
The Russian military, despite suffering considerable setbacks during the late summer of 2022, has made consistent progress along the front lines in 2024, having captured strategic positions like Avdiivka, with military analysts predicting that these gains could accelerate in 2025.
The Russian army has captured strategic strongholds in Ukraine like Avdiivka
Moscow has also escalated its air strikes on civilian targets and energy infrastructure in recent years, aiming to undermine the morale of the Ukrainian populace.
Russia’s territorial gains have come at a devastating cost in human lives, a fact about which Mr. Putin seems indifferent (the military is currently recruiting 30,000 men each month). Despite these advances, Russia has not undertaken any major breakthroughs utilizing combined arms operations.
In contrast, Ukraine is grappling with serious battlefield challenges, and after three years of conflict, its citizens are fatigued by war.
Kyiv has improved significantly in terms of ammunition and drones (Ukraine now produces about 30% of the drones it requires), counteracting Russia’s earlier advantages, but it suffers from a lack of manpower, insufficient personnel rotations at the front, and the mobilization of inexperienced troops.
“The creation of new brigades has really complicated matters,” explains Michael Kofman, a military analyst and co-host of the War on the Rocks podcast.
“They have been mobilizing untrained recruits, and instead of replacing losses at the front, they have allowed experienced brigades to deteriorate, only to create new brigades that, for lack of a better term, are combat nonviable.”
However, if Ukraine can stabilize the front—potentially supported by President Trump seeking Congressional approval for an additional military aid package—Kyiv could find itself in a comparatively strong position when negotiations commence.
What incentive does Vladimir Putin have to pursue peace?
Very little, it would seem.
The Russian president has transitioned his nation into a war economy, elevating defense spending to 8% of GDP (in comparison, the EU’s average is only 1.3%), recruiting thousands of North Korean soldiers (thereby internationalizing the conflict), and reconfiguring his foreign policy to challenge the West at every opportunity.
Putin’s oppressive grip at home appears secure (the death of mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in a plane crash in 2023 served as a warning to anyone contemplating his removal).
If Mr. Putin is making gradual gains on the battlefield and suspects that Mr. Trump might withdraw military support, he has even less incentive to agree to a settlement (as one observer has noted, talking is not synonymous with negotiating).
Moreover, Mr. Putin has not publicly renounced his war objectives: the domination of Ukraine, reducing it to a subordinate state, and annihilating its history and culture. Since the Trump-Putin conversation, the Kremlin has discussed “eliminating the causes of the conflict.”
In the wake of European capitals expressing alarm over this phone call, Mr. Putin’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, revived one of those “causes” by accusing the EU of “arming the very Nazi Kyiv regime to wage war against the Russian Federation,” although Putin’s broader (and perhaps more accurate) war aims can likely be found in the ultimatum Russia issued in December 2021.
Mr. Putin proposed two draft treaties prohibiting Ukraine and other Eastern European countries from joining NATO while calling for the withdrawal of US forces from nations that joined NATO after 1997 (most of whom subsequently became EU members).
The proposals were dismissed as absurd by the West, but there is no indication that Mr. Putin has withdrawn them entirely, and Mr. Trump’s ongoing rhetoric about NATO withdrawal is likely music to his ears.
The Russian president has made no secret of his ambitions: he perceives Russia as a great power deprived—by the failures of Bolshevism and the Western victory during the Cold War—of its right to dominate its sphere of influence in a multipolar world.
Despite Mr. Trump’s complimentary words about the Russian leader following their conversation, the irony lies in the fact that while Mr. Putin seeks to negotiate over Ukraine, he views the United States as a declining superpower that should remain the Kremlin’s adversary.
“The United States remains Russia’s principal rival, not Ukraine,” stated Fiona Hill, who served as Trump’s Russia advisor during his first term, and Angela Stent from the Brookings Institution, in February 2023.
“Putin is intent on negotiating directly with Washington to ‘deliver’ Ukraine, aiming ultimately for the US president to sign away the future of the country.
Donald Trump seen meeting Vladimir Putin during a summit in Finland seven years ago
“He has no interest in meeting directly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. His goal remains akin to the agreement reached in 1945 at Yalta, where U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sat across the table from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, endorsing Moscow’s dominance over Eastern Europe without consulting the affected nations.”
EU capitals remain profoundly skeptical about Mr. Putin’s intentions, which is why security guarantees hold immense importance for both Europe and Ukraine—particularly for the Baltic states, which are acutely aware that Russia may harbor ambitions towards them once it has dealt with Ukraine.
Mr. Zelensky faces pressure to cede some of the occupied territories as part of a deal; this would be an intensely bitter concession, given the immense sacrifices Ukrainians have made, and he will only entertain it in exchange for security guarantees ensuring that Mr. Putin does not simply take a ceasefire to regroup.
For Ukraine, NATO membership represents the most cost-effective and rapid guarantee of security, as Article 5 would deter potential Russian aggression. In the absence of that, legally binding security assurances from European member states, supported by potentially 200,000 peacekeepers (according to Kyiv’s estimates), would serve as a second-best solution, with some US involvement deemed crucial.
The Trump administration seems to have dismissed the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO altogether. Secretary General Mark Rutte has highlighted that while the alliance proclaimed at its Washington summit last summer that Ukraine could join if specific criteria were met, no promises were made as part of any negotiated solution.
This consideration will weigh heavily on Kyiv if and when negotiations commence.
The even heavier burden will be the reality of Russia retaining Ukrainian land, both because it constitutes a blatant land grab, and because the terror regime established by Moscow, and the aggressive Russification of annexed areas—where many still have ties to unoccupied Ukraine—enables the Kremlin to exert pressure on Ukraine sans cost.
“As many Ukrainians see,” writes Nataliya Gemunyuk, the CEO of The Public Interest Journalism Lab and co-founder of The Reckoning Project in Foreign Affairs, “the brutal acts committed in occupied regions—human rights violations, political oppression, and war crimes—are in fact integral to Russia’s military strategy.
“The issue extends beyond the fate of those under Russian occupation; it involves how Moscow exploits its control over significant numbers of Ukrainians to destabilize the entire nation, even without additional territorial acquisitions.”
At ground zero, Ukrainians in occupied territories face executions, torture, imprisonment, the systematic eradication of Ukrainian literature and libraries, and the suppression of the language, according to numerous reports, as Moscow pursues its strategy of enforced colonization.
Ukraine estimates that between 2012 and 2022 approximately 800,000 Russians were settled in Crimea, violating international law.
Politically, Mr. Zelensky might find it feasible to advocate for the temporary retention of certain Ukrainian territories under Russian control, similar to how East Germany eventually reunited with West Germany after the Cold War.
The crucial difference is that the Soviet Union did not attempt to obliterate the German identity of those in the GDR. This is precisely the grim objective that Vladimir Putin has in territories he has conquered, and it is a goal he will undoubtedly resist relinquishing.
In the end, how tough will the dealmaker Donald Trump be?
